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AwnLs-NEG.IGENCE n KsaWnG-Scwqma-T sPSsnG--PERSOoAL IN-
juRa s.-An action of tort was brought to recover compensation for personal in-
juries to the plaintiff caused by the defendant's cow. The cow had escaped from
the defendant's pasture adjoining the premises of the plaintiff. The evidence
showed that the pasture of the defendant, from which the cow escaped, was
insecurely fenced. While attempting to drive the cow from her garden, the plain-
tiff Was "butted" and knocked to the ground, sustaining the injuries of which
she complained. The defendant contended that the trial judge was not justified
in finding that the cow escaped through the defendant's negligence, and that the
plaintiff could not recover in the absence of proof of scienter. The court held
that the plaintiff, in order to recover for the personal injuries, need not prove
scienter. Walker v. Nickerson, 197 N. E. 451 (Mass. 1935).
At the common law the owner of domestic animals and fowls was strictly
liable for their trespasses on the land of others irrespective of the keeper's neg-
ligence. HARpmR, LAW Or TORTS § 166; THROCKMORTON'S CoOLEY ON TORTS § 244.
Liability existed irrespective of the personal fault of the owner. Blackstone seems
to have thought liability depended on negligence in keeping the animals. 3 BL.
Comm. 211. This view is not supported by the English cases. In the leading case
of Cox v. Burbidge, 13 C. B. (N. S.) 430 (1863), the court said: "If I am the
owner of an animal in which by law a right of property can exist, I am bound
to take care that it does not stray into the land of my neighbor; and I am
liable for any trespass it may commit, and for the ordinary consequences of that
trespass. Whether or not the escape of the animal is due to my negligence, is
altogther immaterial."
The common-law rule of strict liability is in force in many states in this
country. This rule is sometimes stated to be "that one was under a duty to fence
his live stock in but not to fence others' live stock out." CLARx, LAW OF TORTS
§ 114. In some of the western states the common-law rule is regarded as un-
suitable to existing conditions, and they adopt the rule that one need not fence
his own live stock in but must fence others' live stock out. CUAx, LAW OF TORTS
§ 114.
"As to the liability for acts of domestic animals other than trespasses to land,
the English common-law rule was that the owner or keeper was liable regardless
of the amount of care used where he knew of the dangerous tendency of animal."
CLARx, LAW OF TORTS § 115. "The gist of the action is not negligence in the
manner of keeping the animal, but the keeping him at all with knowledge of his
vicious propensity. . . . Some courts, however, hold that the gist of the action
is negligence in failing to exercise due care in securely restraining the animal, a
rebuttable presumption of such negligence being raised whenever the animal in-
flicts injury." THEOcxmORTON1s COOLEY ON TORTS § 250. The rule in Massachu-
setts is that whoever keeps a domestic animal that is accustomed to attack and
injure mankind, with knowledge of this tendency in the animal, "is prima fade
liable in an action on the case, at the suit of any person attacked and injured by
the animal, without any averment of negligence or default in the securing and
taking care of it. The gist of the action is the keeping the animal after knowledge
of its mischievous propensities." Popplewell v. Pierce, 10 Cush. 509 (1852). It
seems, however, that in this jurisdiction the injured person may proceed on the
ground of negligence also. See Cooper v. Cashman, 190 Mass. 75, 76 N. E. 461,
3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 209 (1905). If he proceeds on the theory of negligence, it is
said that the "negligence on which liability is founded is keeping such an animal
with knowledge of its propensities." Cooper v. Cashman, supra.
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Proof of a dangerous propensity in a domestic animal, such as a cow or a
horse, is generally essential to recovery, at the common law, where the animal
was rightfully in the place where a personal injury to the plaintiff occurs. But
if the animal is trespassing on the plaintiff's premises at the time of the injury
to the plaintiff, proof of scienter, or negligence in the manner of keeping the
animal, is not generally essential to a recovery against the owner of the animal.
This is the principle on which the decision in the principal case was based. This
general principle has been stated by the New York Court of Appeals as follows:
".. . where the owner of such animals [horses, cattle, sheep, swine, and the
like] does not confine them on his own land, and they escape and commit a
trespass on the lands of another, without the fault of the latter, the law
deems the owner himself a trespasser for having permitted his animals to break
into the inclosure of the former under such circumstances. And in declaring
against the defendant in an action for such trespass, it is competent for the
plaintiff to allege the breaking and entering his close by such animals of the
defendant, and there committing particular mischief or injury to the person or
property [such as the defendant's horse injuring the plaintiff's horse by kicking
it] of the plaintiff, and, upon proof of the allegation, to recover as well for the
damage for the unlawful entry as for the other injuries so alleged, by way of ag-
gravation of the trespass, without alleging or proving that the defendant had
notice that his animals had been accustomed to do such or similar mischief. The
breaking and entering of the close in such action is the substantive allegation,
and the Test is laid as matter of aggravation only." Van Leuven v. Lyke &
Dumond, 1 N. Y. 515, 517 (1848) (the defendant's sow, while trespassing on the
plaintiff's land, mutilated and mangled the plaintiff's cow and calf). A large num-
ber of cases support this general rule. Beckwith v. Shordike & Hatch, 4 Burr.
2092, 98 Eng. Rep. 91 (1767); Angus v. Radin, 2 South. 815 (N. 3. Law 1820)
(oxen broke the plaintiff's close and killed his cow); Smith v. Garnero, 113
Wash. 368, 194 Pac. 375 (1920); Morgan v. HudneU, 52 Ohio St. 552, 40 N. E.
716, 49 Am. St. Rep. 741, 27 L. R. A. 862 (1895); McKee v. Trisler, 311 Ill.
536, 143 N. E. 69, 33 A. L. R. 1298 (1924).
Thus, while the particular injury itself may not support an action for dam-
ages without an allegation and proof of scienter, yet if it is part of the damage
suffered from the trespass, it goes to swell a recovery which the unlawful entry
justifies. THROCKmoRTON's COOLEY ON TORTS § 255. This rule applies only when
the injured person is one that can maintain an action for the unlawful entry.
THROCKMORTON's COOLLY ON TORTS § 255; Peterson v. Conlan, 18 N. D. 205,
119 N. W. 367 (1909). Contra, Troth v. Wills, 8 Pa. Super. Ct. 1 (1897) (with
a strong dissenting opinion is support of the rule as stated herein). A stranger
(one who is not the owner of the real estate on which the animal is trespassing
at the time of the injury to him or his property) must prove scienter. Peterson
v. Conlan, supra. It seems that the action of the stranger would have to be one
for negligence in the manner of keeping the animal in view of its known pro-
pensities. See Peterson v. Conlan, supra. The stranger would have to show that
the injury complained of was one that the animal, in view of its known pro-
pensities, might reasonably be expected to commit. See Peterson v. Conlan, supra.
In the absence of knowledge of a vicious propensity in the animal trespassing
on another person's real estate, the owner is liable only, at the common law,
for such damage to the person or property of the plaintiff on whose property it
is trespassing when it injures him in his person or injures his personal property;
for such damage as is caused by the natural propensity of the animal; and this
is to be determined by its normal disposition. 2 JAooARu, LAw or ToRTS § 855;
Lee v. Riley, 18 C. B. (N. S.) 722, 144 Eng. Rep. 629 (1865). If the injury
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complained of was due to some particular vice or propensity of the particular
animal, it seems that the plaintiff would have to show scienter in order to es-
tablish that the damage was proximate. Lee v. Riley, supra. Thus, where the de-
fendant's horse, while trespassing on the plaintiff's land, kicked the plaintiff's
horse, the result was proximate. Lee v. Riley, supra. And where the defendant's
horse injured the plaintiff's horse by biting and kicking her through the fence
separating the plaintiff's land from the defendant's, the damage was held not to
be too remote. Ellis v. Loftus Iron Works, L. R. 10 C. P. 10 (1874). On the
other hand, where the injury is not the result of the ordinary nature of the
animal, such as a horse kicking a child, the owner is not liable, in the absence
of a knowledge of the horse's vicious temper. Cox v. Burbridge, 13 C. B. (N. S.)
430, 143 Eng. Rep. 171 (1863); 2 JAaaARD, LAW OP ToRas § 855.
In Cox v. Burbridge a child, lawfully on a highway, was kicked by the de-
fendant's horse, grazing there. The action was for negligence in keeping the
horse. No scienter was alleged or proved. On the contrary, there was evidence
showing that the horse was a quiet animal. There was no evidence showing that
the horse was in the highway through the defendant's negligence. The court
held that the action would not lie without an allegation, supported by proof,
that the defandant knew that his horse was liable to kick persons. The defend-
ant did not know that his horse, contrary to its ordinary nature, would probably
kick a child on a highway. A contrary result was reached in Goodman v. Giy,
15 Pa. St. 188, 53 Am. Dec. 589 (1850). The action was in case for-injuries re-
ceived by the plaintiff's son, resulting from a kick of the defendant's horse
while the horse was at large within the limits of a city. The court, in holding
that it was actionable negligence to permit a horse to run at large and unattended
on the streets of a city regardless of their vicious character or of scienter, and
that the result was expectable, said: "The owner has no right, either by law or
custom, to turn d horse loose in the streets of a city. All men know that a
horse which has been stabled and well fed will, when turned out, run and
plunge, and become dangerous in the midst of people. . . . I might say that
all horses are, when turned loose, more or less dangerous in confined streets; and
all men know this."
While Cox v. Burbridge and Goodman v. Gay were cases wherein the action
was for negligence and was brought directly for the personal injury in each in-
stance, in the latter the defendant voluntarily turned his horse out in the city
streets, while in the former there was no evidence as to how the horse happened
to be in the highway. This distinguishes the two cases on- the facts and as to
the nature of the defendant's act in each instance. But as far as forseeability of
the consequences is concerned contrary results are reached in them.
"It seems well-settled that at common law it was not unlawful for horses
and other domestic animals to run at large upon public highways." Fox v.
Koehnig, 209 N. W. 708, 710 (Wis. 1926). On the other hand, it is generally con-
sidered actionable negliglence to leave "a horse or team untethered and un-
guarded on a public street." Roberts v. Griffith Co., 280 Pac. 199, 200 (Cal. 1929),
and authorities cited. But It is not unlawful per se at common law for one
to depasture one's horses, or other live stock, on a country road adjoining
one's premises; this principle is based on the rule that a property owner,
through whose land a highway is established, owns the fee in the highway sub-
ject to the public easement. Holden v. Shattuck, 34 Vt. 336 (1861). Accordingly,
it has been held that where the defendant's horse, while at large on a country
highway adjoining the defendant's premises, exoited the plaintiff's horse to run
and injure itself, the plaintiff could not recover without showing that the cir-
cumstances and occasion, or that the habits and character of the animal were
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such as to indicate carelessness on the part of the defendant, with reference to
the safety and convenience of travelers on the highway. Holden v. Shattuck,
supra. In Massachusetts it has been considered unlawful for one to permit domes-
tic animals to go at large on the highways without a keeper; and it has been
held that in such cases the owner is liable for all damages caused directly, either
to persons or property, by domestic animals running at large on the highways.
Leonard v. Doherty, 174 Mass. 565, 55 N. E. 461 (18991) (swine scaring horses
traveling on the highway); Barnes v. Chapin, 4 Allen 444 (1862) (a colt,
while following its dam, which was led by its owner, was attacked and killed
by a stray mare of the defendant). In England, at the time of the decision in
Cox v. Burbridge, it seems that no one could have complained of the presence of
domestic animals on a highway, as a wrong per se, except the owner of the fee
in the highway, or the public. In some cases in this country, dealing with the
question of liability for the acts of animals while they are running at large on
highways, there is either a state statute or a city ordinance making it unlawful
to permit live stock to run at large on the highways.
Where it is unlawful for one's domestic animals to go upon a public highway
or the streets of a city unattended some courts have adopted practically the
doctrine of absolute liability, while, at the same time, purporting to hold the
owner liable only for those consequences that he could reasonably have forseen.
Goodman v. Gay, supra; Roberts v. Griffith Co., 280 Pac. 199 (Cal. App. 1929).
In Massachusetts the doctrine that the owner of domestic animals is liable for
all damages committed by them while they are unlawfully on the highways of
the State or are in the streets of a city unattended is applied. Hardiman v.
Holley, 172 Mass. 411, 52 N. E. g1g, 70 Am. St. Rep. 292 (1899).
James W. Myers.
EXECUTORS AND ADxmSTRAToRs-EiDENcz---APPA= AmD EIo.-A recent
Iowa case, Johnston v. Johnston, 261 N. W. 908 (1935), while reiterating and ap-
plying a familiar principle of law, nevertheless applies it to a set of facts that
evokes a discussion of an interesting legal problem. Section 12032 of the IOWA
CODE OF 1931 provides as follows: "No person who feloniously takes or causes
or procures another so to take the life of another shall inherit from such person,
or receive any interest in the estate of the decedent as surviving spouse, or take
by devise, or legacy from him, any portion of his estate." An application was
made for a widow's allowance, and after overruling the objections of the admin-
istrator, Raymond Johnston, the court entered an order allowing the widow $1,000
for a year's support. In the resistance filed by the administrator to the above
application it appears that the widow was tried for the murder of the decedent
and was convicted of manslaughter, and this is set up as bringing the case under
the statute above quoted denying any right to the decedent's estate under the
conditions therein set forth. The decision of the lower court was affirmed on the
main ground that there was not in the resistance any allegation of a felonious
killing, and that the plea that the widow was convicted in the district court
availed the administrator nothing, as the fact of her conviction was not even ad-
missible to the district court, except possibly to prove there had been a judgment,
but to prove none of the facts back of it.
The plea of the administrator technically did not come within the requirements
of the statute. True it says in the resistance that "his death was caused by gun-
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shot wounds inflicted on the said Herbert T. Johnston by the applicant herein,
his surviving spouse." The statute requires that the act be done feloniously. The
court contended that the act relied upon might have been done inadvertently or
in self-defense, or accidentally. Various courts hold that statutes of this nature
should be strictly construed and pleadings under it must bring the case within
the letter of the statute. In In Re Tarbo's Estate, 172 At. 139 (Pa. 1934), the
court, after construing the statute similar to the Iowa statute, held that the
estate of the father who fatally shot his daughter and then committed suicide was
not precluded from taking the daughter's estate by inheritance since the father
had not been "adjudged" guilty of murder within the statute precluding in-
heritance. Three of the seven judges dissented vigorously to this decision of the
majority. It would appear that the dissenting opinions in this case are sounder
in theory and in policy. The intention of the legislature in enacting the statute
was to outlaw definitely such an unconscionable mode of acquiring property.
The reason for the statute was found in the fundamental concepts of equity and
public policy. The intention of the legislature was not to declare, consciously,
that murderers who were not "adjudged guilty" should profit by their crime.
But the decision of the majority of the court inferentially established that to be
their intention.
It is the opinion of the writer that the Iowa court, in the instant case, like-
wise contributed to an inequitable result and established a precedent contrary to
the spirit of and reason for the statute in question when it ruled that the omis-
sion of the word "feloniously" in the administrator's resistance negatived the
possibility of the statute applying. The resistance alleged that "the death of
Herbert T. Johnston was caused by gunshot wounds inflicted on the said Herbert
T. Johnston by Pearl Johnston, his surviving spouse." The omission of the word
"feloniously" in the above allegation was controlling in the decision even though
this allegation followed: "That Pearl Johnston was tried for the murder of
Herbert T. Johnston in the District Court in and for Ringgold County, Iowa,
and was on November 2, 1934, convicted of manslaughter, and, that said Pearl
Johnston was on December 17, 1934, duly sentenced and judgment entered under
said conviction of manslaughter." Under modem civil practice, courts are less
wont to be hypercritical than formerly, and the language of the pleader is con-
strued so as to save him harmless from many technicalities of the common law
system of pleading. Foster v. Elliott, 33 Iowa 216 (1871); Gray v. Coan,
23 Iowa 344 (1867); Brown v. Tregoe, 236 N. Y. 497, 142 N. E. 159 (1926);
Kansas Wheatgrowers' Association v. Bridges, 124 Kan. 601, 261 Pac. 570 (1927);
State v. Ford Motor Co., 114 Ohio St. 221, 151 N. E. 171 (1926); United States
Nat. Bank v. Town of Swiss, 196 Wis. 176, 218 N. W. 945 (1928). The acknowl-
edged-policy of Civil Practice Acts to construe pleadings so as to arrive at their
common intendment would indicate that it would not have been necessary for
the Iowa court to lean over backward in order to hold the administrator's re-
sistance sufficient in the instant case.
Another important question was raised in the case, namely whether or not a
conviction in a criminal prosecution is a bar to a subsequent civil proceeding, for
any reason other than to prove the fact of its rendition. The court quotes from
34 CoaPus JuaRs, page 970, Section 1387, to the effect that, "By the great weight
of authority and in the absence of any statute to the contrary, a judgment or
sentence in a criminal prosecution is neither a bar to a subsequent proceedings
founded on the same facts nor is it proof of anything in such civil proceeding,
except the mere fact of its rendition. So where the same acts or transactions con-
stitute a crime and also give a right of action for damages or for a penalty, the
acquittal of defendant when tried for the criminal offense is no bar to the




In a note appendant to Micks v. Mason, 145 Mich. 212, 108 N. W. 207, 11
L. P. A. (N. S.) 653 (1906), it is said: "It has been laid down by the courts
as a general rule, and repeated by the text writers, that a judgment in a criminal
prosecution cannot be given in evidence in the civil action to establish the truth
of the facts on which it is rendered." This rule has practically universal applica-
tion. In Johnson v. Girdwood, 7 Misc. 651, 28 N. Y. S. 151 (1894), it was
held in an action to recover damages for an arrest, conviction, and imprisonment
procured by fraud, duress, and conspiracy, the plaintiff alleging that he was
innocent, the judgment of conviction is not conclusive on the question of the
plaintiff's guilt, but is open to impeachment. In an interesting Texas case, Landa
v. Obert, 78 Tex. 33, 14 S. W. 297 (1890), it was decided that in an action to
recover money alleged to have been extorted under duress in consequence of a
threatened prosecution for embezzlement, the fact that the plaintiff was sub-
sequently tried and acquitted of the crime of embezzlement is not admissible to
establish his innocence. See: Stone v. United States, 167 U. S. 178 (1897); Car-
lisle v. Killebrew, 89 Ala. 329, 6 So. 756, 6 L. R. A. 617 (1889); Small v. Har-
rington, 10 Idaho 499, 79 Pac. 461 (1904); In re Mason, 147 Minn. 383, 181 N.
W. 570 (1921); Towle v. Slake, 48 N. H. 92 (1868); Chenes v. Rosenwasser
184 App. Div. 837, 169 N. Y. S. 38 (1918); Shock v. Peters, 59 Tex. 393 (1883).
It has been held in a number of cases that a judgment in a criminal pro-
ceedings may be admissible in a civil suit involving the same facts and particu-
larly when entered on a plea of guilty, although there is strong authority to the
effect that such judgment is not conclusive evidence, and may be contradicted.
Woodruff v. Woodruff, 11 Me. 475 (1834); Markett v. Gemke, 154 N. Y. S. 780
(1915); State v. Well, 83 S. C. 478, 65 S. E. 634, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 461
(1909); Crawford v. Bergen, 91 Iowa 675, 60 N. W. 205 (1894). The grounds for
the admissibility of evidence under such facts is that such evidence is a species
of admission. It is obvious that the admission of such evidence is not a relaxa-
tion of the general rule in specific cases, but constitutes an exception to or limita-
ton of that rule.
The application of the rule by the Iowa Supreme Court in the instant case
illustrates strikingly the rigorous inflexibility of the general doctrine that the
judgment of a criminal court cannot be received in evidence, in the vast majority
of cases, in a civil suit involving the same set of facts, except for the purpose of
proving the mere fact of its rendition. It is presumptuous perhaps to attempt to
indict the operation and consequences of a rule of evidence that has been time-
tested and seemingly found necessary since the very early days. In manifold cases
the rule obviously is equitable, just and necessary. The want of mutuality, the
dissimilarity in object, issues, procedure, and parties in the criminal and civil
suits are the traditional and proper grounds justifying the application of the
rule in the majority of the cases. But practically speaking, the application of
the rule in a proceedings involving the facts presented in the instant case is
rather difficult to defend. The plaintiff, convicted of having murdered her hus-
band, has had all the extra safeguards of a criminal trial and has been found
guilty by evidenee sufficient to warrant that judgment "beyond a reasonable
doubt" and not by a "mere preponderance of the evidence." The same facts
are involved, the same object is sought. It would be infinitely more difficult for
her to prove that she is innocent of the crime of manslaughter in a civil suit.
In the matter of proof alone she could not hope to better her position. The same
situation is presented in cases where after being adjudged guilty of arson in a
criminal court, the person is allowed to collect from an insurance company as
a direct result of the application of the rule being discussed. "It has been held
that a criminal sentence or acquittal will be admissible in evidence in a sub-
sequent suit, civil in form but penal in character, to enforce a penalty or for-
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feiture of property against the same defendant, on the same state of facts, but
this exception does not apply where the parties are not the same." JuDGMENTS,
34 C. J. 971; Coffey v. United States, 116 U. S. 436 (1886); Ex parte Stephen,
114 Cal. 278, 46 Pac. 86 (1896); In Re Food Conservation Act, 254 Fed. 893
(D. C., S. D. N. Y. 1918). The principle of law relative to penalties and for-
feitures which provides the basis for the exception just noted might possibly be
applied so as to extend the operation of this important exception to cases in-
volving factual set-ups as found in the instant case. The analogy between the two
types of cases is not wanting.
John J. Locher, Jr.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-CONDITIONS PRECEDENT To STTnio ASIDE-REsoRT
TO OTHER PRoPERTY.-In the recent Indiana case of Kennedy v. Lubre Co., 196
N. E. 366 (Ind. App. 1935), the court held that a creditor must show that his
debtor did not leave sufficient assets with which to pay his debts in order for
the creditor to succeed in an action to set aside a voluntary conveyance of the
debtor as fraudulent. That is to say, a man who is indebted may make a volun-
tary conveyance that will be valid and cannot be successfully attacked by credi-
tors without a showing that his other property has been exhausted or is insuffi-
cient to pay his debts.
The general rule, which Indiana adheres to, is that a person indebted in large
amounts, whether as principal or surety, is not entitled to make a voluntary con-
veyance of his property and thus defeat a collection of the debts. The reason for
this general rule is tersely put by the Supreme Court of Indiana as follows: "The
claims of justice are paramount to those of affection and charity." Law v. Smith,
4 Ind. 56, 61 (1853). While this general rule is recognized in Indiana, this State
recognizes, along with several other states, that the mere fact that a person is
indebted, even in large amounts, does not prevent him from making a voluntary
conveyance that will be valid as against any particular creditor. Before any par-
ticular creditor can attack such a conveyance on the ground that it is fraudulent,
he must show that the debtor who made the conveyance does not have sufficient
other property with which to satisfy the particular claim. This principle seems
to have been established for the first time in Indiana in 1853 in the case of
Law v. Smith, supra; and it has been dhered to consistently in a large number
of decisions in this State-ever since. Baugh v. Boles, 35 Ind. 524 (1871); Morgan
v. Olvaney, 53 Ind. 6 (1876); Sell v. Bailey, 119 Ind. 51, 21 N. E. 338 (1889);
Brumbaugh v. Richcreek, 127 Ind. 240, 26 N. E. 881 (1902). The complaint of
a creditor, in an action to set aside a conveyance on the ground that it was made
to defraud creditors, in order to be sustained on demurrer, must allege that at the
time the suit was brought the debtor had no other property out of which the
debt of the creditor might be collected, or had no other property subject to
execution. An omission of such an averment is fatal on demurrer to the com-
plaint. Brumbaugh v. Richcreek, supra; Jackson v. Sayler, 30 Ind. App. 72, 63
N. E. 881 (1902).
In other jurisdictions while a voluntary conveyance is not necessarily fraudu-
lent as to creditors, yet a creditor, in order to reach such property to satisfy his
claim, need not show that the debtor who made the conveyance did not have
any other property out of which the claim might be satisfied. Vasser v. Hender.
son, 40 Miss. 519, 90 Am. Dec. 351 (1866); Dalton v. Barron, 293 Mo. 36, 239
S. W. 97, 22 A. L. R. 187 (1922).
